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NOTE
QUESTION: WHO SAYS $20 MILLION
DOLLARS ISN’T SUBSTANTIAL?
ANSWER: THE IRS DOES
THE “SUBSTANTIAL” PROBLEMS WITH THE
LAWS OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
ROBERT SINGLETON*
INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been a lot of misconception and misunderstanding
when it comes to the laws of tax-exempt organizations, specifically as they
apply to churches. These misconceptions and misunderstandings are under-
standable once one goes to the Internal Revenue Code and reads the seem-
ingly clear language in § 501(c)(3). Regarding churches, § 501(c)(3) says
that any entity “organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . pur-
poses . . .” shall be exempt from taxation.1 The organizations listed in
§ 501(c)(3), including churches, are granted tax exemption because of their
publicly desired charitable purposes and societal benefits.2
Churches and other § 501(c)(3) organizations reap tremendous eco-
nomic benefits from their tax-exempt statuses.3 First, they are exempt from
federal income taxation, as well as federal unemployment tax.4 They also
qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions for income, estate, and gift
tax purposes.5 They may also issue tax-exempt bonds to finance some of
their activities,6 enjoy lower postage rates,7 and qualify for exemption from
multiple state and local taxes. This subsidy from the government is not
* Juris Doctor, University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2012.
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
2. Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317 (2007).
3. Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches
Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 43
(2004).
4. Id. at 43 & n.90.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, 2522 (2012).
6. See I.R.C. § 145 (2012).
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available to other organizations or individuals that fall outside § 501(c)(3)’s
coverage.8
While § 501(c)(3) grants a church its special tax-exempt status, it also
imposes a restriction on a church’s involvement in lobbying activities.9 The
lobbying restriction provides that “no substantial part of the [church’s] ac-
tivities . . . [can involve] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation . . . .”10 Further, a church or charity loses its tax-
exempt status if it conducts or participates in one or more substantial non-
exempt activities that are not dedicated “exclusively” to its charitable
purpose.11
While this framework sounds fairly simple, there are many deficien-
cies in the laws of § 501(c)(3). One of the most recent and most publicized
deficiencies in the laws of charities and I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) involved the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS” or “Mormon”) and its
significant role in supporting the passage of California’s 2008 ballot initia-
tive barring legal recognition of same-sex marriages in the state.12 The bal-
lot initiative is more popularly known as Proposition 8. After Proposition 8
passed in 2008, there was a large public outcry demanding an investigation
of the Mormon Church for violating § 501(c)(3)’s restrictions on political
lobbying.13
This Comment analyzes the facts surrounding the Mormon Church and
its involvement in Proposition 8 to illustrate how deficiencies in § 501(c)(3)
allow large charitable organizations to circumvent political lobbying restric-
tions. Ultimately, it is unclear whether the Mormon Church violated federal
tax laws under § 501(c)(3). However, what is clear from the Mormon
Church’s involvement is that the current laws for tax-exempt organizations
fail to limit multi-million dollar lobbying expenditures, so long as they are
made by sufficiently massive non-profit organizations.14 Qualified
§ 501(c)(3) organizations receive many benefits and have grown incredibly
wealthy due to their tax-exempt statuses.15 It makes no sense, however, to
7. U.S. POSTAL SERV., PUB. 417, NONPROFIT STANDARD MAIL ELIGIBILITY: NONPROFIT AND
OTHER QUALIFIED ORGANIZATIONS 2-2 (2006), available at http://pe.usps.gov/cpim/ftp/pubs/
pub417/pub417.pdf.
8. Tobin, supra note 2, at 1342. See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (The Supreme Court stated that “[b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deduct-
ibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”).
9. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012).
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
11. See Brian Galle, Colloquy, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of
Charities, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 370, 371 & n.5 (2009) (“[T]he presence of a single non-educational
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number of impor-
tance of truly educational purposes.” (citing Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v.
United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945))).
12. Id. at 370.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. James, supra note 3, at 43 (citing ALFRED BALK, THE RELIGION BUSINESS 7 (1968)).
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allow a § 501(c)(3) organization to leverage that same wealth to circumvent
the lobbying restrictions imposed as a condition of their tax-exempt status. I
will discuss how this failure to adequately limit such large lobbying ex-
penditures, combined with the lack of guidelines governing lobbying by
charities, not only creates ambiguity that makes adequate enforcement by
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) difficult, but also provides for poten-
tial abuses from significantly large organizations, particularly churches. Ul-
timately, I argue that religious organizations should be subject to an
absolute lobbying ban under § 501(c)(3).
Part I of this Comment provides the background and framework of
§ 501(c)(3) and the lobbying restrictions. Part II details the Mormon
Church’s involvement in Proposition 8 and analyzes the restrictions in
§ 501(c)(3) in relation to the church’s involvement. Part III identifies sev-
eral problematic issues that arise when churches get involved in politics
through lobbying efforts, and offers potential solutions for alleviating them.
Part IV concludes, arguing that if § 501(c)(3) cannot be updated to properly
limit political lobbying by modern religious organizations, then Congress
should impose an absolute ban on lobbying by these institutions.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF I.R.C. § 501(C)(3).
The legislative history of § 501(c)(3) does not shed much light on the
uncertainties in the laws of charities. The lobbying limitations imposed on
charitable organizations were added to the federal tax law as part of the
Revenue Act of 1934.16 Pennsylvania Senator David A. Reed, the ranking
minority member of the Senate Finance Committee, stated that the purpose
of the amendment was to prohibit tax exemption for “any organization that
is receiving contributions, the proceeds of which are to be used for propa-
ganda purposes or to try to influence legislation.”17 He also said that the
Committee on Finance proposed the amendment with the intent to deny
deductibility of a contribution of a charitable gift “if it is a selfish one made
to advance the personal interests of the giver of the money.”18 Mississippi
Senator Byron Pat Harrison furthered this notion, stating that the intent of
the Finance Committee, basically, was to stop deductible contributions for
legislative ends.19 Prior to 1934, § 501(c)(3) provided that the income tax
should not apply “to any corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no
part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stock-
holder or individual . . .”20 Senator Harrison’s provision was incorporated
into the statute following the word “individual,” adding the language “and
16. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 640 (9th ed. 2007).
17. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934).
18. Id.
19. 78 CONG. REC. 5,959 (1934).
20. Chase Manderino, Comment, Understanding the Lobbying Efforts of a Church: How Far
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST112.txt unknown Seq: 4 14-NOV-13 12:25
2012] PROBLEMS WITH THE LAWS OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 395
no substantial part of the activities of which is participation in partisan
politics or is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation.”21
When adopting the lobbying restriction, the Senate Finance Committee
did express concern that the scope of the remedy generated by the provision
was broader than the problem for which it was being enacted.22 Citing
“great difficulty in phrasing the amendment,” Senator Reed stated, “this
amendment goes much further than the committee intended to go.”23 How-
ever, while assessing the far-reaching consequences of the amendment, no
concern for churches was ever expressed by the Senate. Rather, the con-
cerns expressed by the Committee were focused on organizations that relied
on “unselfishly motivated” contributions to further their charitable cause,
such as charities aimed at preventing cruelty to children and animals.24
Since concern about the effect of the provision as to churches was never
expressed, a church would not be able to rely on the legislative intent be-
hind the provision as a defense to the application of the lobbying
restriction.25
The legislative history shows that lawmakers intended to prevent the
government from subsidizing lobbying efforts by prohibiting “the funneling
of money through a charity to influence legislation.”26 The provision ap-
pears to have been intended to apply to all charitable organizations.27 It is
highly doubtful that legislators intended only for the restriction to apply to
economically small organizations while allowing an economically large or-
ganization to circumvent the law simply because the massive amount it con-
tributes to lobbying is just small fraction of its overall budget.28
A. Alternative Theories for the Lobbying Restriction.
In spite of the limited congressional record, several commentators in-
cluding Brian Galle29 and Donald Tobin30 have offered alternative theories
is Too Far? 2009 BYU L. REV. 1049, 1054 (citing Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat.
172).
21. Id. (citing 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934)).
22. Id. at 1055 (citing 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934)).
23. 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934).
24. See id.; see also HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 640 (showing the legislative purpose was to
deny deductibility of a selfishly motivated charitable gift); Manderino, supra note 20 at 1055
(“[T]he concern focused on organizations that had a direct reliance on legislation to advance their
charitable cause, such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and the Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.”).
25. Manderino, supra note 20, at 1055.
26. Id. at 1065.
27. See 78 CONG. REC. 5,861 (1934); see also Manderino, supra note 20, at 1055 (“[A] plain
reading of the statute does not distinguish between churches and other charitable organizations.”).
28. Galle, supra note 11, at 378, 379.
29. See Galle, supra note 11, at 376–78.
30. Tobin, supra note 2, at 1320–41.
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on the purpose and justification for lobbying limits as they pertain to tax-
exempt organizations.31 First, a large number of 501(c)(3) organizations are
America’s religious institutions, private universities, nursery schools, and
humanitarian organizations.32 Many of these organizations are very well
respected and conduct activities that benefit their communities tremen-
dously.33 This general respect and admiration allows these organizations to
be very influential over those who rely on them.34 The influence exerted
over their communities grants a § 501(c)(3) organization a significant
amount of societal power that makes their participation in lobbying particu-
larly problematic.35 The lobbying restrictions, therefore, help to maintain
charity “as a separate sphere from government.”36 Second, by restricting
lobbying, the IRS is able to limit the amount of political influence wielded
by the wealthy.37 Since wealthy donors typically have more disposable in-
come to give to charity, they are most likely to benefit from the charitable
deduction.38 The lobbying restrictions, therefore, preserve the balance of
power between wealthy donors and the majority by disallowing charities
from using deductible donations for lobbying.39 While obviously having
imperfections and various counter-arguments, these rationales offer some of
the best principled explanations for the current lobbying restrictions.40
B. The Lobbying Restrictions in Section 501(c)(3).
Despite the many ways individuals and organizations lobby, the fed-
eral tax law recognizes two prohibited types of lobbying: direct lobbying
and indirect, or grassroots lobbying.41 “Direct lobbying” is any attempt to
influence legislation through communication with any part of a legislative
body, including its staff members.42 Examples include presentation of testi-
mony at public hearings held by legislative committees, correspondence
and conferences with legislators, electronic communications, and publica-
tions advocating specific legislative action.43 “‘Grassroots lobbying’ con-
sists of appeals to the general public or segments of the general public to
31. See Galle, supra note 11 at 376–78.
32. Tobin, supra note 2, at 1319.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1319–20.
35. Id.
36. Galle, supra note 11, at 377 (citing Tobin, supra note 2, at 1320–41).
37. Id.
38. See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1406 (1988).
39. See id.; Galle, supra note 11, at 377.
40. See Galle, supra note 11, at 377.
41. See HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 641.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(i) (2012).
43. See HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 641.
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contact legislators or take other specific action” (also known as a call to
action)44 regarding legislative matters.45
Section 501(c)(3) states that “no substantial part” of a charity’s activi-
ties can consist of “propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legis-
lation.”46 The IRS attempts to clarify this instruction by providing guidance
in its Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations.47 For purposes
of measuring lobbying activities, churches are subject to a “substantial part
test.”48 “Whether a church’s or religious organization’s attempts to influ-
ence legislation constitute a substantial part of its overall activities, [for the
purposes of this test,] is determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts
and circumstances in each case.”49 The IRS considers a variety of factors
including the time devoted by paid workers or volunteers, money spent in
relation to the organization’s entire budget, “the amount of publicity the
organization assigns to the activity, and the continuous or intermittent na-
ture of the . . . [activity.]”50 So, in light of all the facts and circumstances
taken into consideration by the IRS, what exactly does the IRS deem to be
substantial?
Case law provides little help in clearing up any ambiguity surrounding
interpretation of the word “substantial.” In the primary cases involving ac-
tual revocation of § 501(c)(3) status, the offending organization either en-
gaged in persistent lobbying, or could not fulfill its purpose without
lobbying.51 Alternatively, in the primary case in which a court found the
amount of lobbying permissible, the organization at issue was devoting less
than five percent of its “time and effort” towards lobbying.52 Since the vio-
lations, or lack of violations, in these cases were obvious, there is little
guidance on how to resolve issues and scenarios where the outcome is less
44. See id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(iii) (The phrase encouraging the recipient
to take action with respect to legislation means that the communication (1) states the recipient
should contact a legislator or employee of a legislative body; (2) states the address, telephone
number, or similar information of a legislator or employee of a legislative body; (3) provides a
petition, tear-off postcard, or similar material for the recipient to communicate with a legislator or
employee of a legislative body; or (4) specifically identifies one or more legislators who will vote
on the legislation as opposing the communication’s view with respect to the legislation).
45. See HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 641.
46. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
47. See I.R.S., PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS,
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
48. Id. at 6; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (2012) (stating that lobbying is
subject to the substantial part test when “attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or
otherwise” is a substantial part of its activities).
49. I.R.S., PUB. NO. 1828, supra note 47, at 6.
50. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,148, at 6 (Jan. 28, 1975).
51. See Galle, supra note 11, at 372 (citing Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry v. United States,
470 F.2d 849, 855–56 (10th Cir. 1972); Kuper v. Comm’r, 332 F.2d 562, 563 (3d Cir. 1964);
Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146–47 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
52. See Galle, supra note 11, at 372 (citing Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th
Cir. 1955)) (holding that 5 percent of an organization’s lobbying activities were insubstantial and
therefore did not have an adverse affect on the organizations tax-exempt status).
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predictable.53 This lack of guidance provides little help in determining close
cases and presents a problem for practitioners attempting to advise their
clients, thereby strengthening the case for an absolute lobbying ban.
In the context of determining whether an activity constitutes a “sub-
stantial unrelated non-exempt purpose (commercial activity),” courts have
attempted to provide clearer guidance. The U.S. Tax Court held that a char-
ity, whose non-exempt expenditures were around ten percent of its total
revenue, was not engaging in a “substantial” amount of commercial activ-
ity.54 However, courts have rejected using a bright-line “percentage test” or
an absolute percentage safe harbor when determining what is or is not “sub-
stantial” enough to violate § 501(c)(3).55 The court’s reasoning for rejecting
such safe harbors would likely have the same applicability in the context of
lobbying since the “political-limitations language was originally a codifica-
tion of an earlier appellate court decision, which itself was an interpretation
of the ‘exclusively’ charitable requirement.”56 Also, like the courts, the IRS
has opted out of using a bright-line percentage test and instead relies on all
the facts and circumstances in question.57
Based on the existing enforcement and interpretation of § 501(c)(3),
there is a great deal of uncertainty for courts, the IRS, § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, and legal practitioners. Because advisers rely on case law to advise
taxpayers with regard to tests that depend on facts and circumstances, law-
yers and accountants are faced with the very difficult task of trying to deter-
mine what is or is not a substantial lobbying activity.58 Finally, practitioners
are unable to counsel clients regarding prior practices of the IRS since those
practices go undisclosed.59 Again, this uncertainty highlights another
strength for the argument for an absolute ban on lobbying.
C. The § 501(h) Election.
Charities wishing for more certainty than that provided by § 501(c)(3)
can elect into that certainty under I.R.C. § 501(h).60 Section 501(h) permits
an organization to designate “up to $1 million in lobbying expenditures
during a taxable year, based on a percentage . . . of expenditures for exempt
53. See Galle, supra note 11, at 372.
54. See id.; see, e.g., World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 967 (1983).
55. See Manning Ass’n v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 596, 610–11 (1989).
56. Galle, supra note 11, at 372 n.11 (citing Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133,
1140–41 (Ct. Cl. 1974)) (citing Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930)).
57. SCOTT A. TAYLOR, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IN A NUTSHELL 95
(2011); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 50 (suggesting that the Service should not
adopt a percentage of total expenditures test).
58. Tobin, supra note 2, at 1358.
59. See id.
60. See Galle, supra note 11, at 372; see also I.R.C. § 501(h) (setting forth definite rules for
evaluating lobbying expenditures).
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purposes.”61 Section 501(h) also has an “amnesty” provision of sorts for
organizations that exceed their limitation during a single year.62 To lose its
tax-exempt status, an organization must exceed the Treasury Regulation’s
150% limitation over a four-year period.63 Therefore, making a § 501(h)
election gives a charitable organization a more predictable avenue for lob-
bying without jeopardizing its tax-exempt status.
Currently, however, churches cannot make a § 501(h) election.64 Pro-
fessor Galle suggests that, by disallowing churches from making a § 501(h)
election, Congress’s intentions were to discourage “any lobbying expendi-
tures by religious organizations.”65 Further, some churches may reject the
application of § 501(h) to their organization on the belief that a direct in-
volvement in politics is not part of their mission and that application of
§ 501(h) “would condone some level of political activity by churches.”66
II. THE LAW APPLIED TO THE FACTS SURROUNDING PROPOSITION 8
EXPOSES A SERIOUS HOLE IN THE TAX LAWS OF CHARITIES.
In the weeks before and after the passage of Proposition 8 in Novem-
ber 2008, there was an enormous outcry from gay rights advocates, along
with many others in the general public, calling for an investigation of the
Mormon Church’s involvement in the campaign.67 Many argue that the
Mormon Church violated the lobbying restrictions imposed by
§ 501(c)(3).68 The following is an overview of the facts surrounding the
Mormon Church’s involvement in the Proposition 8 campaign. As other
scholars examining the issue have also observed,69 the facts reported by
various major news outlets are not in dispute, application of the law cer-
tainly is.70
61. Manderino, supra note 20, at 1065–66; see also I.R.C. § 501(h)(2)(B) (setting maximum
level of lobbying expenditures at 150% of the “lobbying nontaxable amount . . . determined under
section 4911”); I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (2012) (setting forth the method of determining the “lobbying
nontaxable amount”).
62. See Manderino, supra note 20, at 1066.
63. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (2012) (stating the rule that an organization will lose
tax-exempt status if its lobbying expenditures are “normally” in excess of the maximum allowable
amount); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(b)(1)(i) (2012) (defining the term “normally” as the sum of
lobbying expenditures averaged over a set of “base years”); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(c)(7) (defin-
ing “base years” as a period of four years).
64. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(5).
65. Galle, supra note 11, at 376 n.32.
66. Manderino, supra note 20, at 1066.
67. See Galle, supra note 11, at 370.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 373.
70. See id.
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A. Factual Background: Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church.
On May 15, 2008, the Supreme Court of California overturned a 2000
California law that established marriage as between a man and a woman in
the case of In re Marriage Cases.71 Following this decision, California re-
sidents opposing gay marriage prepared a ballot proposition. Proposition 8,
was certified and placed on the ballot on June 2, 2008.72
Several churches supporting Proposition 8 formed a “coalition” in op-
position to same sex marriage.73 The Mormon Church joined the “coali-
tion,” just weeks after the California Supreme Court’s decision, after being
approached by the Roman Catholic archbishop of San Francisco.74 On June
29, 2008, Mormon Church leadership announced its support for Proposition
8 in a letter drafted and sent to be read at all Mormon congregations in
California.75 In this letter, Mormon leaders from Salt Lake City urged
church members to “do all you can to support the proposed constitutional
amendment by donating of your means and time.”76
In the weeks leading up to the vote, Mormon officials took part in a
satellite broadcast from Salt Lake City to Mormons in California and Utah,
as well as students at Brigham Young University.77 In this broadcast, the
Mormon leaders urged viewers to contact “‘friends, family and fellow-citi-
zens in California’” and encourage them to support the initiative.78 The
broadcast also urged young Mormons to “use texting, blogging, videos,
71. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757, 183 P.3d 384 (2008) (holding that a Family
Code provision stating that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California” is unconstitutional).
72. See Press Release, California Secretary of State, Secretary of State Debra Bowen Certi-
fies Eighth Measure for November 4, 2008, General Election (June 2, 2008) available at http://
www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2008/DB08-066.pdf.
73. See Peggy Fletcher Stack, Young Mormons Urged to Join Fight Against Gay Marriage in
California, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 9, 2008, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=10671847
&itype=NGPSID [hereinafter Stack, Young Mormons] (reporting the Protect Marriage Coalition
as “an umbrella organization of several religious bodies including Catholics and Evangelicals);
see also Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/politics/15marriage.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0 (describing the coalition as a group comprised of “Catholics, evangelical Chris-
tians, conservative black and Latino pastors, and myriad smaller ethnic groups with strong relig-
ious ties”).
74. See McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73.
75. See California and Same-Sex Marriage, MORMON NEWSROOM, (June 20, 2008), http://
www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/california-and-same-sex-marriage (Last visited Mar. 13,
2013).
76. Id.
77. See Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 73; see also Peggy Fletcher Stack, LDS Church
Woos Californians in Utah to Back Gay Marriage Ban, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 8, 2008, http://
archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=10664599&itype=NGPSID [hereinafter Stack, LDS Church
Woos Californians] (describing the LDS Church’s plans towards actively supporting Proposition
8).
78. Stack, LDS Church Woos Californians, supra note 77.
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podcasts, Twitter, and Facebook to ‘go viral’ in support of [Proposition
8].”79
The Mormon Church’s requests were substantial. L. Whitney Clayton,
a Mormon General Authority, and member of the Church’s First Quorum of
the Seventy,80 stated in the broadcast that the church was “looking for 30
people in every ward in California to commit 4 hours each until the election
[on Proposition 8].”81 A ward is what the Mormon Church calls its local
congregations.82 To put the numbers Clayton called for into perspective,
there are 165 Mormon stakes in California.83 Each stake consists of five to
twelve wards.84 For simplicity’s sake, assuming an average of seven wards
per stake, there are approximately 1155 wards in California.85 Thirty mem-
bers per ward, committing to four hours of volunteer time each, would
equate to 138,600 hours of volunteer time. Based on the above estimates, an
incredibly large amount of volunteer time and manpower went to work in
response to the Mormon Church’s requests.
Estimates suggest that “80% to 90% of the early volunteers who
walked door-to-door in election precincts” were Mormons.86 “[M]ormon
wards in California . . . were assigned two ZIP codes to cover.”87 Scripts
provided to volunteers by the Protect Marriage Coalition were incredibly
specific.88 If a voter believed that marriage was an institution of God,
“church volunteers were instructed to emphasize that Proposition 8 would
restore the definition of marriage that God intended.”89 Conversely, if a
voter believed that marriage was a man-made institution, volunteers were
instructed to stress, “that Proposition 8 was about marriage, not about at-
tacking gay people, and about restoring into law an earlier ban struck down
by the [California] Supreme Court.”90 There is no question that the instruc-
tion and effort of the Coalition, the Mormon Church, and their volunteers
were very meticulous.91
79. Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 73.
80. Elder L. Whitney Clayton, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, http://
www.lds.org/church/leader/l-whitney-clayton?lang=eng (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
81. Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 73.
82. What is a ward/stake/branch?, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
http://mormon.org/faq/ward-stake-branch. (last visited on Dec. 28, 2012).
83. ONLY MORMON, California LDS Wards & Stakes, ONLY MORMON, http://www.onlymor
mon.com/Stake-Directory/California/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).
84. Id.
85. Id. The estimations above are mine alone based on the range of wards in California
reported by ONLY MORMON.
86. See McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73 (quoting Jeff Flint, strategist for the Protect
Marriage Coalition).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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On top of the door-to-door campaigning, phone trees were established
in California and Utah so that Mormon Church members could “call
friends, family and fellow citizens in California to urge support of the effort
to defend traditional marriage and see Proposition 8 pass.”92 The Church
also set up preservingmarriage.org, a website featuring several “videos ad-
vocating passage of [Proposition 8].”93
Throughout all of their efforts, Mormon Church leaders were very con-
scious and strategic in their attempts to avoid excessive entanglement be-
tween the Church and the political lobbying efforts.94 In one of the
documents to its members, the church emphasized that “[n]o work will take
place at the church, including no meetings there to hand out precinct walk-
ing assignments so as to not even give the appearance of politicking at the
church.”95 The Mormon Church essentially told its members exactly what it
wanted them to do and exactly how to go about doing it so as not to impli-
cate the Church. In response to the Mormon Church’s requests, it is esti-
mated that Mormons contributed as much as $20 million in support of
Proposition 8’s passage.96
B. Applying the Laws of § 501(c)(3) to the Facts of the Mormon
Church’s Activities.
Based on the IRS’s definition of the term “lobbying,” both direct and
grassroots, there is little doubt that the activities of the Mormon Church and
its members appear to fall within that definition. However, whether or not
the church’s lobbying efforts can be “substantial” for purposes of potential
revocation of its tax-exempt status is a much more difficult and problematic
question.
First, the letter sent out by the Mormon leadership appears to consti-
tute a grassroots lobbying communication under § 501(c)(3).97 The letter
92. Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 75; see also Peggy Fletcher Stack, Prop 8: California
gay marriage fight divides LDS faithful, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.sltrib.com/
ci_10797630 (explaining that LDS leaders tapped every resource, including the church’s built-in
phone trees, e-mail lists and members’ willingness to volunteer and donate money in order to pass
Proposition 8).
93. Jesse McKinley, Inquiry Set on Mormon Aid for California Marriage Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/us/politics/26marriage.html; see also The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, PRESERVING THE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE,
www.preservemarriage.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (stating at the bottom of the website that
the website is “An Official Web site of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints”).
94. See McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(ii) (2012) (“A communication will be treated as . . .
grass roots lobbying . . . if . . . [it] . . . [r]efers to specific legislation[;] . . . [r]eflects a view on such
legislation; and . . . [e]ncourages the recipient of the communication to take action . . .”); see also
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(iii) (2012) (“Where a communication refers to and reflects a view
on a measure that is the subject of a referendum, ballot initiative or similar procedure, the general
public in the State or locality where the vote will take place constitutes the legislative body, and
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specifically made reference to and reflected the Church’s support for Pro-
position 8.98 The letter also encouraged members to take aggressive action
with respect to the proposed legislation.99 The donations, phone trees, and
the door-to-door trekking done by volunteers, certainly fall within the defi-
nition of lobbying activities. Further, the massive amount of manpower and
intense time commitment evidence the significant action taken by Church
members in response to the instructions given to them in the letter from
their leadership.
Determining whether the preservingmarriage.org website and videos
were lobbying activities presents a more challenging analysis. While chari-
ties may engage in and present “nonpartisan” and “objective” analysis
about pending legislation, they may not present one-sided information that
does not represent a “full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts.”100 “Ex-
aminations and discussions of broad social, economic, and similar problems
[are not] considered direct lobbying . . . or grassroots lobbying . . . .”101
However, while a church is allowed to engage in public communication of
an issue, it may not discuss “the merits of a specific legislative proposal . . .
[or] directly encourage recipients to take action with respect to [the]
legislation.”102
Applying the law to the videos on preservingmarriage.org, it is most
likely that they were grassroots lobbying communications as well. Presever-
ingmarriage.org features seven different video presentations that specifi-
cally discuss Proposition 8.103 Each video also expressly encouraged the
public to vote yes on the proposition.104 Several videos addressed separate
“consequences” that would result if Proposition 8 did not pass.105 One
could hardly consider the content of the videos as “nonpartisan” and “objec-
tive” and many argue that the entire vote yes campaign was “dishonest and
divisive.”106 Thus, there is a strong argument that this website and video
collection constitute a grassroots lobbying communication and possibly
individual members of the general public area [constitute] legislators. Accordingly, if such a
communication is made to one or more members of the general public in that state or locality, the
communication is a direct lobbying communication . . .”) (emphasis added).
98. See California and Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 75 (“On November 4, 2008, Califor-
nians will vote on a proposed amendment [Proposition 8] to the California state constitution that
will . . . restore the March 2000 definition of marriage. . . . The church’s teachings . . . on this
moral issue are unequivocal.”).
99. Id. (“We ask that you do all you can to support the proposed constitutional amendment
[Proposition 8] by donating of your means and time . . . . Our best efforts are required . . .”).
100. See Galle, supra note 11 at 373–74 (citing Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1)(ii)).
101. Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(2).
102. Id.
103. McKinley, supra note 93.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST112.txt unknown Seq: 13 14-NOV-13 12:25
404 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
even a direct lobbying communication, therefore running afoul of
§ 501(c)(3).107
C. A Significant Problem In the Way the Word “Substantial” is
Interpreted in § 501(c)(3) is Exposed.
Although the Mormon Church appears to have engaged in prohibited
lobby activities regarding Proposition 8, was that activity “substantial” for
the purposes of § 501(c)(3)? If viewed as a percentage of its overall activity
under the “substantial part test,” the church’s involvement in Proposition 8
would easily fall below the 5–10% thresholds established by existing case
law.108 One of the advantages the Mormon Church has, as several commen-
tators have already opined, is that the massive size of the Mormon Church
makes it virtually impossible for its involvement in Proposition 8 to be con-
sidered “substantial.”109 Like many of America’s organized religions, the
Mormon Church is an economic behemoth.110 The Mormon Church has
approximately 14 million members and 28,784 congregations worldwide.111
Though the Mormon Church’s financial information is not publicly availa-
ble, it’s estimated that its annual revenues reach upwards of $5 billion.112
To put these figures in perspective, the 1155 congregations in California,
which contributed time volunteering, represent approximately four percent
of the church’s total congregation base. Furthermore, the estimated $20 mil-
lion contributed by Mormons would be approximately less than one percent
of the church’s total revenues.
Having decided not to employ a percentage test, the IRS would con-
sider all of the factors surrounding the church’s Proposition 8 activities to
“determin[e] whether its conduct is reconcilable with the requirement that it
107. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2 (b)(1)-(b)(2) (2012).
108. See Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955) (holding that 5% of
activities was not substantial); see also World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 967 (1983)
(holding that 10% of activities was not substantial).
109. Galle, supra note 11, at 374 (citing Janet I. Tu, Mormon Church’s Role in Prop. 8 Fight
Debated, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008 at A12); John D. Columbo, LDS Church, Proposition 8,
and the Lobbying Limitation, NONPROFIT LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 18, 2008), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/nonprofit/2008/11/lds-church-prop.html.
110. ALFRED BALK, THE RELIGION BUSINESS 7 (1968) (“American organized religion has be-
come an economic behemoth . . . [which] has assumed the broad characteristics of a business
. . . .”) (explaining that tax-exempt status has “enabled [churches like the Mormon Church] to
become extremely wealthy.”).
111. Facts and Statistics, MORMON NEWSROOM, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/facts-and-
statistics/ (last updated Dec. 31, 2011).
112. Galle, supra note 11 at 374 (citing RICHARD OSTLING & JOAN K. OSTLING, MORMON
AMERICA: THE POWER AND THE PROMISE xvi (1999)); see also RICHARD OSTLING & JOAN K.
OSTLING, MORMON AMERICA: THE POWER AND THE PROMISE 405 (rev. ed. 2007) (“The U.S.
Mormon membership multiplied by the average U.S. Adventist Contribution would yield revenues
of $4,903,875,402. The foreign Mormon membership would . . . yield $364,651,749. The pro-
jected annual worldwide LDS membership contributions would thus be roughly $5.3 billion as of
1995.”).
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operate exclusively for exempt purposes.”113 Even under this approach, the
Mormon Church is shielded once again by its massive size. The Church can
easily show that when compared to its overall religious activities, its lobby-
ing for Proposition 8 was insubstantial.114
The Mormon Church’s involvement in Proposition 8 exposes one of
the larger problems in applying existing laws of tax-exempt organizations
to modern religious institutions and other charities. While the Mormon
Church’s involvement was substantial under the plain meaning of the term,
one can certainly present a very strong argument that it was not “substan-
tial” for purposes of § 501(c)(3). Professor Galle accurately points out that
to consider such a large, multi-million dollar lobbying expenditure to be
lawful, simply because it is undertaken by an equally large organization,
puts incredible strain on the meaning of “substantial.”115 If the word “sub-
stantial,” as it’s been interpreted in § 501(c)(3), cannot be reigned in to
accurately reflect its plain meaning, then the law should be updated to elim-
inate any permissible lobbying by § 501(c)(3) organizations.
As it stands, the interpretation of the law “grants political influence
only to the largest charities.”116 If only the largest § 501(c)(3) organizations
are allowed to make significant lobbying expenditures, then the power of
these organizations will dwarf that of the smaller organizations.117 For ex-
ample, application of the same facts surrounding the Mormon Church’s lob-
bying activities for Proposition 8 to a smaller church, say one that consists
of only 500 members with yearly revenues of $25,000, results in a much
more clear and opposite conclusion. Based on the current interpretation of
the lobbying rules, there is no way that the smaller church could do what
the Mormon Church did without it being considered “substantial.” To shield
an organization from the law simply because of its massive size is a prob-
lem that runs counter to the original intent behind § 501(c)(3). Since large
§ 501(c)(3) organizations will be the only organizations to receive a subsidy
for lobbying activity, these organizations will become “ideal entities for
political campaign donors”118 and possible legislative corruption.
In an effort to mitigate this issue, commentators have evaluated a mod-
ified § 501(h) test.119 Essentially, under Professor Galle’s approach, the
113. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 50, at 6; see also TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 95
(explaining that IRS applies a facts and circumstances test rather than a strict percentage test).
114. See TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 96 (explaining, based on IRS General Counsel Memo and
related case law, that “organizations should view [a percentage of lobbying activities in relation to
total activities] less than 5% as clearly insubstantial . . . .”).
115. Galle, supra note 11, at 370, 376.
116. Id. at 370.
117. Tobin, supra note 2 at 1317–18.
118. Id.
119. Manderino, supra note 20, at 1066 (citing Galle, supra note 11, at 375) (suggesting em-
ploying § 501(h) valuation rules while recognizing that such an approach would not account for
certain value added by nonprofit lobbyists).
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“fixed limit” standard in § 501(h) would be modified for churches to “take
into account not only actual expenditures, but also the intangible activities
of a church.”120 Such intangibles would include things such as mailing lists
and goodwill.121 This test would “partially incorporate the ‘fairness’ pro-
vided by § 501(h)” by no longer permitting economically larger churches to
“wield greater political influence” than a smaller church by contributing
disproportionate amounts of money to lobbying.122
This test would also better reflect Congress’s intent behind
§ 501(c)(3).123 Professor Galle notes that one inference of that intent can be
drawn from the structure of § 501(h).124 By setting a maximum value of $1
million for lobbying expenditures under § 501(h), Congress either did not
believe that $1 million was “permissible under the ‘substantial’ standard [of
§ 501(c)(3)],” or it did not want to promote expenditures greater than $1
million.125 Regardless, § 501(h) appears to limit what is otherwise an un-
limited interpretation of the word “substantial” in § 501(c)(3).126
Aside from the “excessive entanglement” issues that would inevitably
arise while auditing and valuing the intangible assets of a church,127 Profes-
sor Galle’s § 501(h) approach also fails to resolve the detrimental societal
impacts that result when churches engage in lobbying.
III. THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUES THAT ARISE WHEN § 501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY CHURCHES, ENGAGE IN
LOBBYING ACTIVITIES AT ALL.
As discussed above, the current interpretation of § 501(c)(3) allows a
large enough church to make sizeable lobbying contributions great enough
to defeat any opposition, without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.128
Allowing such activity results in religious institutions becoming more pow-
erful and exerting far too much influence over public policy.129 The collec-
tion of churches that comprised the coalition in favor of Proposition 8 is a
perfect illustration of the consequences that result when churches influence
legislation. It also raises enough concern about the influential power of
120. Id. (citing Galle, supra note 11).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1066–67 (citing Galle supra note 11, at 370, 376).
123. See Galle, supra note 11 at 376–77 (“If [501](c)(3) offers an opportunity for massive
expenditures by massive organizations, then the § 501(h) safe harbor is useless for just those
organization that are most in need of assurance—those that invest a large sum in lobbying.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Manderino, supra note 20, at 1069–70 (noting the difficulty and inherent clarity issues
that would come from quantifying the value of volunteer work, goodwill, and “phone lists used to
solicit help and donations.”).
128. Galle, supra note 11, at 370.
129. See Tobin, supra note 2, at 1317–18.
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these organizations to consider an outright ban on lobbying by § 501(c)(3)
organizations.
A. Increased Political Influence Minimizes the Public Choice.
In his 2007 article, Professor Donald B. Tobin applied the “public
choice theory” to a religious institution’s political campaigning activities in
an effort to examine various issues that arise when a church’s entry into the
political arena is subsidized.130 Public choice theory generally holds that
“government spending is an economic good and that interest groups will
compete to obtain that good for themselves.”131 Therefore, groups wielding
more power and influence are better positioned to “obtain a bigger piece of
the pie.”132 Though typically used as an economic theory, Tobin notes that
the gain in power resulting from a church’s subsidized political campaign-
ing activity “does not necessarily lead to greater economic gains.”133 In-
stead, the church’s subsidized activity leads to its agenda getting pushed on
society, possibly against society’s will.134
Tobin’s application of this theory to § 501(c)(3) organizations exposes
one of the many problematic issues that arises when these entities, espe-
cially churches, get involved in lobbying, or enter the political arena at all.
As stated earlier, § 501(c)(3) organizations are generally well-respected
within their particular communities and are often “valued for their indepen-
dence from the political establishment.”135 Churches, in particular, provide
a tremendous benefit to society. However, as distinguished from other
highly regarded § 501(c)(3) organizations, churches are held in a very deep,
personal, and spiritual position and have an extremely loyal, trustful follow-
ing. A church is therefore better positioned to influence its members and
others who depend on them.136 Further, a church’s message to its members
likely has a greater impact than the same message from someone else.137
After all, a church’s supporters and members are also its primary benefi-
ciaries.138 Professor Tobin concludes that a religious organization’s subsi-
dized entry into politics, therefore, unnaturally results in an increase in that
organization’s power, presence, and position in the political arena.139
While Tobin’s theory is unquestionably a controversial one, its appli-
cation to the lobbying restrictions and the Mormon Church’s activities sur-
rounding Proposition 8 appears to perfectly illustrate the significant power
130. Id. at 1326.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1326–27.
134. See Tobin, supra note 2, at 1327.
135. Id. at 1337.
136. Id. at 1319–20.
137. Galle, supra note 11, at 375.
138. Gergen, supra note 38, at 1434.
139. See Tobin, supra note 2, at 1326.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST112.txt unknown Seq: 17 14-NOV-13 12:25
408 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:1
and influence a church can wield over the political process, against the will
of the majority. With less than a month before the November 2008 vote,
support for Proposition 8 still trailed the opposition.140 In response, Protect
Marriage’s chief strategist, Frank Shubert, sent an e-mail pleading for
“money to save traditional marriage from ‘cardiac arrest’” to the 92,000
people registered with the Coalition’s web site.141 Mr. Schubert emailed his
“executive committee” comprised of top members of the Catholic, Evangel-
ical, and Mormon churches.142 At this point, the strongest push for Proposi-
tion 8 was made.
Particular to the Mormon Church, great efforts were made to influence
the outcome for Proposition 8. Its leadership pleaded to students at Brigham
Young campuses to “go viral” in support of the California ballot initiative,
stating, “God will bless you as you do your part.”143 Later, another official
within the church, L. Whitney Clayton, made a plea to its members in Cali-
fornia stating, “[w]e are looking for 30 people in every ward in California
to commit 4 hours each until the election.”144 Finally, Clayton voiced need
for participants in an additional “100-hour program” November 1–4,
2008—the last weekend before the election.145
While churches by no means agree with one another about many of the
issues on today’s public agenda, they certainly have the power to form a
formidable theological front when they do agree on something.146 Within a
matter of days after the urgent appeal from the coalition and the Mormon
Church, the campaign raised more than $5 million.147 The funds raised in-
cluded a single $1 million donation from Alan C. Ashton, the grandson of
David O. McKay, a former president of the Mormon Church.148 The coali-
tion effectively pushed its position to victory, perhaps against the will of the
majority.149
140. McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 73.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by Charities
Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1057,
1107 (2008) (arguing that “Churches as a whole plainly do not form a united theological front
. . . .”); Peggy Fletcher Stack, Prop 8 Involvement a P.R. Fiasco for LDS Church, SALT LAKE
TRIB., November 21, 2008, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_11044660 [hereinafter Stack, Prop 8
Involvement] (quoting Evangelical Rev. Jim Garlow, “Our theological differences with Mormon-
ism are, frankly, unbridgeable, but these are our friends and neighbors . . . .” while reporting that
Mr. Garlow said that the Proposition 8 campaign deepened his relationship with Mormons.).
147. McKinley & Johnson, supra note 73.
148. Id.
149. See Tobin, supra note 2, at 1327.
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B. Moral Advocacy v. Lobbying From the Pulpit.
While Professors Galle and Tobin both provide thoughtful discussion
on the benefits of restricting churches from politically campaigning and
lobbying, neither scholar thoroughly examines the negative effects that
campaigning or lobbying from the pulpit have on a church’s member base.
Some of the effects, which I will examine further, are troubling enough
themselves to warrant an absolute ban on lobbying by churches.
Neither § 501(c)(3) nor the Internal Revenue Code prohibits churches
from advocating a moral stance on a particular issue.150 However, they
should not use their powerful position to influence legislation.151 Though a
church’s position on a political candidate or a piece of legislation can gen-
erally be inferred from its stance on issues such as abortion, contraception,
or same-sex marriage, this is allowed.152 However, it is inappropriate for
churches to “use their resources, or the power of God” to argue in favor of a
specific political candidate153 or a piece of legislation.
There is a distinct line between moral advocacy and political lobbying,
and that line is blurred when letters or sermons urging members to act upon
a specific political matter are read from the pulpit. The pulpit is where cler-
gymen deliver inspiration in the form of sermons, lessons, and other strong
and powerful words of wisdom. When members are urged to act on a politi-
cal matter from that same clergyman, standing at that same pulpit, that mes-
sage is too easily construed as the will of the church.
When lobbying takes place from the pulpit, an incredible personal bur-
den is placed on devout members who may not agree with their church’s
position on the particular issue that they are being urged to act upon. It was
reported that during the Proposition 8 campaign some Mormon wards in
California asked its members for “hefty financial donations, based on [the
Church’s religious] tithing.”154 Some wards even went so far as to ask its
members “to stand or raise their hands to publicly indicate their support”
during services.155 One Mormon columnist even likened Proposition 8’s
opponents “to those who sided with Lucifer against Jesus in the pre-mortal
existence,” in one of his writings for an online Mormon magazine.156 Mem-
bers felt divided and alienated from a church that many consider their sanc-
tuary.157 Such burdens and alienation are the inexcusable result of the type
150. Tobin, supra note 2, at 1335.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Peggy Fletcher Stack, Prop 8: California Gay Marriage Fight Divides LDS Faithful,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_10797630.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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of undue influence that makes a religious organization’s involvement in po-
litical lobbying problematic and inappropriate.
When a letter is read from the pulpit asking members to “do all you
can to support the proposed constitutional amendment by donating of your
means and time . . . [o]ur best efforts are required to preserve the sacred
institution of marriage,”158 members are too easily misled into believing
that they are campaigning with their church rather than independently as an
individual. Specifically, with regard to their efforts with Proposition 8,
“[b]ecause the LDS Church routinely asks its members to give time and
money [for religious and humanitarian purposes, its members] are ‘uniquely
situated to be mobilized into politics . . . [b]ut they only get mobilized when
a match is lit.”159 In this case, that particular match was lit at the pulpit.
Some have argued that while Mormon leadership merely asked its
members to do something, “the actual ‘doing’ [was] left to the individual
and their agency.”160 However, such an argument seems disingenuous.
Mormons are consistently recognized for being “among the most devout
religious groups in the country.”161 Mormons believe that their leadership is
comprised of apostles and prophets of God to be viewed in the same light as
Abraham, Moses, Isaiah and the apostles in the day of Jesus Christ.162 They
also believe that these apostles and prophets receive divine “revelation and
inspiration [from God] to guide the [Mormon] Church as a whole.”163
Therefore, when a respected Mormon leader speaks, Church members listen
to his words very intently.
It would also be disingenuous to argue that, through the Mormon hier-
archy’s satellite broadcasts through its local leadership, church members
were simply given “suggestions” on the types of actions they could take,
such as the call centers, “viral” campaigning, monetary donations, and go-
ing door-to-door.164 The Church cannot “suggest” that its members take
action that it is expressly prohibited by law from taking itself. Such actions
taken by the Mormon Church are grassroots lobbying at its finest.165
158. California and Same Sex Marriage, supra note 75 (emphasis added).
159. Stack, Prop 8 Involvement, supra note 146 (quoting David Campbell, a political science
professor at the University of Notre Dame.).
160. Mormonism and Politics/California Proposition 8, THE FAIR WIKI, http://fairmormon.
org/Mormonism_and_politics/California_Proposition_8 (last modified Nov. 5, 2012).
161. Ryan Tobler, Major New Study of Religion Has Much to Say About Mormons, MORMON
NEWSROOM BLOG (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/major-new-study-
of-religion-has-much-to-say-about-mormons.
162. Prophets, MORMON NEWSROOM, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/prophets (last
visited April 4, 2013).
163. Id.
164. Stack, Young Mormons, supra note 73.
165. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(ii-iii) (2012) (“A grass roots lobbying communication
is any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general
public or any segment thereof.”).
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Finally, “lobbying from the pulpit” also creates confusion amongst
church members regarding exactly who or what they are donating to. Do
they believe they are donating directly to the church or do they believe they
are donating to a political lobbying campaign? I.R.C. § 162(e) expressly
disallows deducting lobbying and political expenditures.166 Members that
are unclear as to what they are donating for, or members that mistakenly
believe that they are donating to the church, may be deducting these dona-
tions as charitable contributions. Assuming that these members are itemiz-
ing their deductions, this effectively creates the type of government subsidy
that § 501(c)(3) was designed to preclude.
C. Congress Should Impose an Absolute Ban on Lobbying by Churches.
Congress should eliminate the problems caused by churches lobbying
from the pulpit by imposing an absolute ban on lobbying by § 501(c)(3)
organizations. This ban would be similar to the “individual participation”
restrictions found in the political campaign activity prohibitions for
§ 501(c)(3) organizations. Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), “churches and relig-
ious organizations are absolutely prohibited from” involving themselves in
the activities of a political candidate’s campaign.167 This includes contribut-
ing money or publicly stating its position on a particular candidate.168 How-
ever, in an effort to protect a religious leader’s freedom of expression to
engage in political activities as an individual, the law distinguishes between
activities done in a leader’s “official” capacity and those that are “per-
sonal.”169 Since religious leaders are prohibited from making partisan com-
ments in their official church capacity, leaders are responsible for clarifying
whether their comments are representative of their personal views, or the
organization’s.170
The political campaign prohibition still allows a § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion to advocate its moral position, but “they must avoid any issue advocacy
that functions as political campaign intervention.”171 Examples of advocacy
that might be considered intervention in a political campaign include state-
ments that favor or oppose a particular candidate, identify a candidate by
name or picture, refer to political party affiliations, or other distinctive fea-
166. “No deduction shall be allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred in connection with—
(A) influencing legislation, (B) participation in, or intervention in, any political campaign on be-
half of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office, (C) any attempt to influence the
general public, or segments thereof, with respect to elections, legislative matters, or referendums,
or (D) any direct communication with a covered executive branch official in an attempt to influ-
ence the official actions or positions of such official.” I.R.C. § 162(e) (2012).
167. I.R.S., PUB. NO. 1828, supra note 47, at 7 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. HOPKINS, supra note 16, at 686.
170. I.R.S., PUB. NO. 1828, supra note 47, at 7.
171. Id. at 8.
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tures of a candidate’s platform or biography.172 By applying these same
absolute restrictions to lobbying, a church could still morally advocate its
position on a particular issue. However, churches would be prohibited from
“officially” making statements that advocate for or against a specific piece
of legislation or identify a piece of legislation by name. Such a restriction
on churches would not only enhance the purpose behind the lobbying re-
strictions, but it would alleviate the potential for abuse and undue influence
over members since members would be able to better distinguish their
leader’s personal message from the Church’s. An absolute restriction on
lobbying would also better protect churches by providing a more bright-line
rule that remedies the ambiguities of the “substantial part” test.
CONCLUSION
There are clearly some holes within the laws of tax-exempt organiza-
tions. Existing precedent does not seem consistent with the legislative intent
behind these laws. Continuing to compare a church’s lobbying activities to
its overall size is not an appropriate way to analyze and enforce the lobby-
ing restrictions. Doing so places churches and charities on an unequal play-
ing field. It also allows taxpayer subsidies to not only be used to impose the
will of one church over another, but also over those taxpayers who are in
essence subsidizing the efforts. The current standards also fail to consider
the important role that all § 501(c)(3) organizations play in our society. The
lobbying restrictions imposed on these organizations are good for the orga-
nizations, their members, donors and society. If applied to churches, an ab-
solute ban would help prevent potential division and alienation within the
church caused by differing viewpoints of the church and its members on
legislative issues. Finally, the restrictions help avoid the problematic entan-
glement between a church and government by creating a clear line between
moral advocacy and political lobbying.
When legislators proposed the lobbying restrictions in 1934, they
likely did not anticipate the immense economic size of the modern day
§ 501(c)(3) organization. There would be no better time for congress to re-
evaluate § 501(c)(3) and bring it up to date in order to reflect the reality that
is modern, multi-million dollar, tax-exempt organizations. The Mormon
Church’s involvement in Proposition 8 presents a unique circumstance that
illustrates this problem with the current standards of § 501(c)(3). Judicial
precedent suggests that the Church’s size almost certainly guards it from
any serious threat of losing its tax-exempt status.173 However, that does not
mean that its actions were not problematic or undeserving of some level of
scrutiny.
172. Id.
173. Galle, supra note 11, at 378.
